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1. Introduction 
 
The equity premium (the difference between stock and risk-free returns) is 
central to many aspects of finance, including the estimation of the cost of capital. 
Mehra and Prescott (1985) measure the U.S. equity premium between 1889 and 1978. 
They argue that an average equity risk premium of approximately 6 percent is too 
large to be explained by reasonable estimates of relative risk aversion. Alternatively, 
the risk inherent in investing in the stock market is low given the low correlation 
between stock returns and consumption, or other important risks faced by individuals 
such as labour income or house price risk.1 Such a large, and perhaps unwarranted, 
equity premium has a number of important implications for both investors and firms. 
For example, it provides a potential motivation for investing US Social Security funds 
in stocks rather than government bonds, while for firms it determines their cost of 
equity capital. A number of solutions have been proposed to what has been termed the 
equity premium puzzle. Given the difficulty in rationalising such a large premium in 
terms of what investors might reasonably expect to earn on equity, the focus of much 
of the research has attempted to justify the realised premium by distinguishing it from 
the premium that would have been expected.  
Amongst these solutions is that proposed by Rietz (1988), who suggests that 
the equity premium will incorporate the probability of a substantial crash in output or 
consumption. Even a low probability crash may increase expected equity premiums 
significantly. Similarly, Brown, Goetzmann and Ross (1995) argue that survival bias 
is important, observed equity premia being biased upwards by the survival of the 
markets from which they are measured. A market, such as the US, will yield an 
                                                          
1
 See, for example, Heaton and Lucas (2000). 
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upwardly biased equity premium simply because it survives an absorbing lower 
bound. In their analysis, markets that do well will survive, and will therefore register 
equity premia that are substantially larger than markets that do not survive. This 
argument may seem plausible given that a feature of stock markets around the world 
during the last 100 to 150 years is the high proportion that have been subject to 
sustained periods of market closure. Consistent with this view is the finding by Jorion 
and Goetzmann (1999) that the real rate of capital appreciation has historically been 
higher in the US than in a number of other countries.  
The implication of this is that perhaps the equity premium puzzle is not a 
puzzle after all. If an issue such as survival bias is important, then the equity premium 
appears excessive simply because it is based on estimates obtained from US stocks, 
and therefore based on a market that has survived continuously over the period. Such 
an argument may have been difficult to dispute given that the overwhelming focus of 
research attempting to explain or justify a substantial equity premium has been based 
on US stock returns. Dimson, Marsh and Stanton (2002) extend the previous research, 
and estimate equity risk premia for sixteen countries throughout the 20th century. 
They find that the equity premium realised in the US is consistent with premia 
estimates obtained for fifteen other countries. As a result, they are able to reject the 
survival bias argument supported by Jorion and Goetzmann (1999). In this paper, we 
also examine whether equity premia derived from the analysis of stock returns for a 
number of countries over long periods are consistent with those obtained from US 
data. Using some alternative data sources, we similarly show that there is no evidence 
that the US equity premium is unusual. In particular, our results imply that the 
realisation of a large equity premium has been relatively widespread, and is not 
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confined to the US stock market. As a result, it is not possible to distinguish between 
the realised and expected risk premium on the basis of survivorship. 
The alternative approach to rationalising the equity premium puzzle is to 
explicitly determine if the historically large premium obtained by investors was 
anticipated. This approach uses fundamentals to yield measures of the expected equity 
premium. Two related points emerge. Firstly, estimates of the expected premium 
derived from fundamentals appear to deviate from those observed historically, 
particularly during the last fifty years. Secondly, current estimates of the expected 
premium are considerably lower than the historically realised premium. Fama and 
French (2002) suggest that both points are related to the de-coupling of the realised 
equity premium from that expected by investors. The most likely cause of this is the 
realisation of a substantial, but unanticipated, capital gain. This capital gain, they 
argue, is driven by a decline in the dividend-price ratio due to a fall in discount rates. 
In line with this, a consensus has emerged that the expected equity premium is much 
lower than the premium observed from past returns, and is confirmed by two surveys 
conducted by Welch (2000, 2001). Welch (2001) notably shows that there has been a 
marked decline in the expected equity premium during the three years between his 
two surveys.  
The second aspect of our study is an examination of the variation over time in 
the respective country premia. Specifically, we seek to establish whether there is any 
evidence from the realised equity premia that might be consistent with the view that 
current expected premia are substantially lower than historically realised premia. Not 
only does our analysis illustrate how sensitive the measured premia are to the precise 
starting point of the data, but it also shows how the realised premia may be influenced 
by institutional factors such as the degree to which markets are integrated. Stulz 
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(1999), for example, suggests that equity premia will be directly influenced by 
globalisation. There is evidence that the extent to which economies, and markets, 
have been integrated has varied over time. We examine whether our estimated equity 
premia provide any evidence that is consistent with such factors having an impact on 
expected premia.  
 
2. Literature 
 
 Following Mehra and Prescott’s (1985) estimation of the US equity premium, 
and the resulting difficulty in rationalising such a large premium with theory, a 
number of studies have attempted to resolve the equity premium puzzle.2 A 
predominant focus of the recent studies is the possibility that the observed or realised 
equity risk premium is not representative of the expected equity premium.3 Perhaps 
foremost among the competing explanations is the view that measuring the equity 
premium over a long period must therefore require the market to have survived for a 
long period, and that this survival induces a bias in the realised equity premium.  
Proponents of this view include Brown, Goetzmann and Ross (1995), who 
develop a model in which market failure is characterised by an absorbing lower 
                                                          
2
 For example, Barberis, Huang and Thaler (2003) argue that a large equity risk premium may be 
consistent with narrow framing – the evaluation of risks in isolation of risks already held by the 
individual. 
3
 An alternative approach has been based on relating the risk of investing in equity to variations in 
consumption. Parker (2001) measures the medium-term impact of stock returns on consumption (rather 
than the contemporaneous impact), and argues that the risk of equity is increased considerably. Further, 
he argues that for the subset of householders that hold equity, the equity premium may be consistent 
with more realistic levels of risk aversion.  
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bound. This implies that market failure is anticipated by falling prices, although they 
do concede that market failure might also be consistent with alternative price paths. 
They suggest that a market with a zero equity premium and a 50 percent survival 
probability over the long term will yield a substantial equity premium if it survives. 
Thus the fact that the US market has survived is likely to have induced a significant 
survival bias in observed (or realised) equity returns, and therefore in the US equity 
premium. 
Jorion and Goetzmann (1999) apply this argument, and suggest that it is 
supported by the evidence relating to stock returns estimated for 39 countries. Rather 
than estimate the equity premium, they calculate the capital return in excess of 
inflation (assuming that differences between the dividend and the real rate are small 
across countries). They argue that their results provide ‘striking evidence in support of 
the survival explanation for the equity risk premium.’ They contrast an annual real 
appreciation rate of 4.3 percent in the US with a median 0.8 percent. The median 
return is 2.4 percent among the 11 countries with continuous data back to 1921. Thus 
not only does market survival appear to be strongly related to the size of the real 
capital return, but this return appears to be highest in the U.S. 
The importance of a survival bias is, however, disputed by Li and Xu (2002). 
They argue that market failure is unlikely to be confined to a scenario of market 
prices hitting an absorbing lower barrier. Market failure could equally result from 
prices hitting an absorbing upper barrier (in the case of hyperinflation) or may be 
independent of the level of stock prices (in the case of war etc.). As a result, the 
requirement in Brown, Goetzmann and Ross (1995) that stock prices hit a fixed lower 
absorbing barrier will generate minimal survival bias once the market has survived 
and prices risen. More importantly, Li and Xu show that a high survival bias requires 
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a high expected probability of market failure. As a result, a survival probability of just 
under one half (the approximate ratio of surviving to failing markets during the last 
one hundred years) induces a survival bias of just one percent. Furthermore, in order 
to generate consistently high survival bias, the probability of market failure has to be 
sufficiently high and therefore the probability of market survival very low. Thus, they 
argue that ‘the real problem with the [Brown, Goetzmann and Ross (1995)] model, 
however, is not the fixed lower barrier, but that high survival bias requires an 
unrealistically high ex ante probability of market failure.’ 
There is some support for this view that survival bias may not be as significant 
as implied by Brown, Goetzmann and Ross (1995). An absorbing lower barrier, as 
modelled by Brown, Goetzmann and Ross (1995), would imply that the effect of 
survival bias should be greatest when the market is young and therefore stock prices 
are closest to the barrier (assuming that prices rise as the market survives). This would 
then imply a reduction in the survival bias the longer a market survives. Siegel (1998) 
shows that the equity premium in the United States has increased considerably over 
time. In particular, he finds that it has increased from 1.9 percent between 1802-1870 
to 6.6 percent between 1926-1997.  
 An alternative, but related argument, is the risk of a large, albeit infrequent, 
crash proposed by Rietz (1988). Assuming that there is a nonzero probability of such 
a crash, and that this probability is incorporated into the market risk premium, the 
expected equity premium will be driven upwards. Moreover, the magnitude of this 
equity premium should be positively related to the probability of the crash. However, 
if this probability is itself related to the frequency of past crashes, then the fact that 
the market in the United States has survived should yield an expected equity premium 
in the U.S. that is lower than the equity premiums observed elsewhere. 
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Dimson and Marsh (2001) estimate the equity risk premium for the UK, US, 
Germany and Japan between 1955 and 1999. They obtain an arithmetic mean equity 
risk premium of 9 percent, 3 percent, 8.9 percent and 9.7 percent respectively. In a 
more comprehensive investigation of the equity risk premium, Dimson, Marsh and 
Staunton (2002) extend this to cover a total of sixteen countries between 1900 and 
2000. They obtain corresponding arithmetic mean equity risk premia of 6.5 percent, 
7.7 percent, 10.3 percent and 9.9 percent, and an average for the complete sample of 
6.2 percent. Furthermore, they show that there has been a significant shift upwards in 
the realised equity premium during the second half of the 20th century. Pre-1950, 
premia were 7 percent and 3 percent in the US and the UK, whilst they were 9 percent 
and 10 percent between 1950 and 2000. This pattern was repeated in almost all the 
sixteen countries studied. 
This shift in the realised equity premium has led recent research to emphasise 
the distinction between the expected premium obtained from fundamentals and the 
realised equity premium. Claus and Thomas (2001) determine the equity premium by 
estimating the discount rates that equate forecasted cash flows (as proxied by analyst 
forecasts) with current market valuations. They obtain an estimate of the mean US 
equity premium from an abnormal earnings model of 3.4 percent between 1985 and 
1998. More importantly, they show that this estimate is consistent with those obtained 
for five other countries, Canada, France, Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom. 
Whilst they note that there is considerable variation in these countries’ underlying 
fundamentals, the equity premium lies between two and three percent, except for 
Japan (where it is somewhat lower).  
Fama and French (2002) also distinguish between measures of the equity 
premium based on the realised average return and fundamentals. They note that for 
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much of the 1872 to 2000 period, the alternative measures of the US equity premium 
produce similar estimates. For example, they show that between 1872 and 1950, the 
dividend growth model and the average stock return produce similar estimates of the 
equity premium (4.17 percent and 4.40 percent respectively). The corresponding 
estimates between 1951 and 2000 are 2.55 percent and 7.43 percent. Fama and French 
(2002) argue that the former measure obtained from fundamentals provides a better 
and more precise estimate of the expected return since 1950.4 The high realised return 
since 1950 must therefore be significantly greater than the expected return over this 
period. They conclude that realised returns substantially in excess of expected returns 
is due to unexpected capital gains, which are in turn driven by a decline in expected 
future returns. The dividend-price ratio falls from 7.18 percent to 1.22 percent 
between 1950 and 2000. If, at the beginning of this period, the dividend-price ratio 
were expected to fall to its long-term average of 4.64 percent, then the remainder of 
this decline would add approximately 2.67 percent of unanticipated compound annual 
return each year.5 
There appears to be a consensus emerging that the current expected equity 
premium is much lower than that observed historically. This would be consistent with 
the finding that the particularly high equity premia realised during the second half of 
the 20th century may have been driven by unexpected capital gains (possibly 
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 Ibbotson and Chen (2003) obtain an estimate for the realised equity premium of 5.24 percent from 
1926 to 2000. They argue that a high price-earnings ratio at the end of the period indicates expectations 
of high earnings growth rates rather than low required returns (assuming that the equity premium is 
constant through time). As a result, their estimate of the equity premium obtained from an earnings 
based measure over this period is 3.97 percent. 
5
 Jagannathan, McGrattan and Scherbina (2001) also argue that the US equity premium has fallen 
substantially. They suggest that it lies between 0 and 2 percent during 1970-99. 
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associated with larger than anticipated cash flows), together with a decline in the 
required risk premium. These factors cannot have been anticipated by investors, and 
therefore yield equity premia that are greater than would have been expected, or 
required, by investors. Perhaps as a result, current forecasts of the equity premium 
have fallen significantly. Welch (2000) surveyed financial economists in 1998 and 
found that the expected U.S. arithmetic mean equity premium was 7.1 percent. A 
follow-up survey in 2001 (Welch 2001) found that expectations had been revised 
substantially, the mean estimates having fallen to 5.5 percent. Whilst such a dramatic 
shift in expectations could have been induced by the research detailed above, it is 
equally possible that they are indicative of the judgemental biases to which 
individuals appear to be susceptible. For example, there is evidence that investors’ 
expectations about future growth rates are based excessively on extrapolations of past 
growth rates.6 That stocks yielded substantial positive returns during the late 1990’s, 
followed by negative returns through 2000 and 2001, may therefore have impacted on 
the equity premium forecasts in Welch (2000, 2001). Perhaps consistent with such 
extrapolation is the difference in forecasts documented by Welch (2001) between 
those respondents classifying themselves as less expert than the average and more 
expert than the average. Their respective average forecasts of the equity premium 
were 4.9 percent and 6.2 percent. 
   
3. Analysis 
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 See La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1997). 
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Ibbotson (2000) defines the equity risk premium as the difference between the 
annual return of large capitalisation stocks and Treasury Bills.7 The standard 
procedure used to estimate the equity premium is the arithmetic mean since this most 
accurately proxies what investors might expect to earn in any particular year. The 
arithmetic mean exceeds the geometric mean by approximately one half the variance 
(assuming that returns are lognormally distributed).  
In Table 1 we calculate the arithmetic equity premium using both short and 
long risk-free rates – bills and bonds. It is standard practice to measure the equity 
premium using bills, since these most closely approximate risk-free investments. 
Bonds, on the other hand, are riskier than bills given their exposure to changes in 
either inflation or real interest rates. Long-term bonds, however, incorporate interest 
rate expectations over the long-term and not just over the very short term as is the 
case with bills. As a result, we would expect the equity premia to be larger when 
measured relative to the short risk-free rates. 
Table 1 
Two clear points emerge from the results in Table 1. Firstly, the equity premia 
are consistently large in magnitude. The means are 6.96 percent and 6.23 percent 
respectively. Associated with these relatively high premia are large standard 
deviations. Secondly, irrespective of the risk-free rate used, the equity premium for 
the US is below both the mean and the median. This, however, does not perhaps 
represent a fair comparison, since we need to bear in mind that the respective equity 
premia are measured using different starting points.  
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 Dimson and Marsh (2001) suggest that geometric differencing may be preferred when making 
international comparisons since it is independent of the choice of unit of measurement. 
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In order to account for this (and therefore to allow for the likelihood that the 
equity premium may vary over time), we measure the equity premia between 1900 
and 2002 for the subset of countries with data available through this period. These 
resulting estimates are comparable to those reported in Dimson, Marsh and Staunton 
(2002). Table 2 presents the results for the nine countries with qualifying equity 
premia. Note that the data for Canada and the Netherlands starts at 1901.   
Table 2 
Our results confirm that the realised equity premium in the US is consistent 
with that for a number of other countries. Over the whole of the 20th century, the 
realised premium for the US is 6.88 percent and 6.15 percent relative to bills and 
bonds respectively. This compares with 5.23 percent and 4.96 percent for the UK. 
Overall, the US premium is marginally below the nine country mean equity premium 
relative to either bills or bonds. There is clearly no evidence to suggest that the 
historically observed US equity premium is significantly greater than that for the 
countries in our sample. This contrasts with the results presented in Jorion and 
Goetzmann (1999), who estimate the real capital appreciation for a large number of 
countries over a comparable period, and suggest that the US experienced a higher risk 
premium than that experienced elsewhere. 
Table 3 
Fama and French (2002) suggest that the expected and the realised equity 
premia have de-coupled since 1950. In particular, they argue that the high realised 
premium in the US since 1950 may have been induced by a significant, but 
unanticipated, reduction in the dividend-price ratio and with it an associated capital 
gain as expected returns fell. In Table 3 we split our sample into two, approximately 
representing the first and second halves of the 20th century respectively. It is clear that 
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there is again no evidence to indicate significant differences in the realised premia 
between the two periods. The respective estimates for the US premium are almost 
identical, as are those for the country means. This, however, does not refute a 
divergence between the realised and expected equity premium as proposed by Fama 
and French (2002). Whilst it is interesting to note that there is clearly greater 
dispersion in the realised country premia during the earlier period, the estimated 
standard deviations are comparable between the two periods. There are good reasons 
for arguing that the earlier period may have represented a considerably greater degree 
of risk for investors, incorporating as it did two world wars and the crash of 1929. 
Thus although the individual country measures of risk appear unchanged, there 
appears to be an increased degree of covariance between the markets during the latter 
half of the 20th century.  
 
4. Market Integration  
 
 In this section, we suggest that the recent evidence of a significant reduction in 
the expected risk premium may be consistent with the evidence we detail of the equity 
risk premium over the period prior to the First World War. Despite the period prior to 
the First World War being significantly more distant in time, it may yield interesting 
insights into the equity premium that investors may require given the similarities that 
exist between that period and the more recent, post Second World War, period.    
Table 4 
As detailed by Fama and French (2002) and Claus and Thomas (2001), current 
estimates of the equity risk premium are significantly lower than those achieved 
historically by investors. Stulz (1999) suggests that the reduction in expected future 
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returns might be consistent with the increased globalisation evident during the latter 
part of the 20th Century. The impact of the changing nature of market integration over 
time is illustrated by Goetzmann, Li and Rouwenhorst (2002). They argue that 
variations in the correlation of equity returns over the last 150 years may be, at least 
in part, indicative of changes in the degree to which markets have been integrated.8 
Furthermore, they suggest that markets were integrated between 1872-1913 and 1972-
2000, and were segmented between 1914-1971. They find that the average correlation 
between four major markets (France, Germany, the UK and the US) was 0.381 during 
integration and 0.146 during segmentation. The pattern of correlations is also different 
when markets are segmented. Consistent with this, the results in Tables 3 and 4 show 
substantial variation in county premia between 1900 and 1950, but not between 1871 
and 1913.  
More fundamentally, Bordo, Eichengreen and Kim (1998) suggest that the 
pre-1914 period also saw a high degree of market integration. They argue that 
international market integration did not reach the levels seen prior to 1914 until the 
1990’s. A number of factors contributed to this earlier period of integration, principal 
among them being the gold standard. Associated factors include the absence of 
currency risk induced by the gold standard, very substantial capital flows and the 
convergence of government bond yields. Bordo (2000) notes that prior to World War 
One, ‘the ratio of both the stock and net flow of foreign investment relative to GDP 
was comparable to or even higher than today.’ Rajan and Zingales (2002) argue that 
‘countries were more financially developed in 1913 than in 1980 and only recently 
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 Two markets are integrated if the expected return to an asset conditional on its risk is the same in the 
two markets. This means that the market does not influence the expected return. If markets are 
segmented, expected returns are likely to differ. 
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have they surpassed their 1913 levels.’  Basu and Taylor (1999) argue that the 
dispersion of real interest rates is only now returning to pre-1914 levels. Obstfeld and 
Taylor (2002), using similar data to Jorion and Goetzmann (1999) (stock returns 
measured in terms of capital gains), find that the standard deviation of returns was 
low prior to 1914. Furthermore, they suggest there is some evidence of increased 
correlation of returns pre-1914.  
As a result, it may be reasonable to regard the pre-1914 period as having more 
relevance for current equity premia forecasts than more recent periods, particularly 
those incorporating the two world wars.9 It is therefore interesting to note that our 
estimates of the equity risk premium during the pre-1914 period are consistent with 
current forecasts of the premium from fundamentals. We find that the equity premium 
in the US between 1871 and 1913 was just 2.18 percent, whilst the mean for the five 
countries for which we have data available is 3.23 percent. This suggests that there 
may be no need to attempt to rationalise the apparent reduction in the equity premium 
by resorting to arguments based on changes in investor preferences or attitudes to risk. 
Rather, a reduction in the equity premium can be justified on the basis that it is 
consistent with the financial environment.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9
 We do not suggest, however, that the extent to which markets are integrated today mirrors or matches 
the pre-1914 era. Markets are clearly very different today. Rather we suggest that the current financial 
environment may bear a closer resemblance in many aspects to the pre-1914 period than it may do to 
more recent periods. This is particularly the case with respect to 1914-1945, but also perhaps to 1945-
1971, during which time exchange rates were largely fixed and capital controls widespread.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
Our research shows that the realised equity risk premia are fairly consistent 
when compared across countries. Furthermore, it is evident from our results that the 
experience of US investors over the last 130 years is fairly typical of the experience of 
investors in a number of other countries. Certainly there is no evidence to suggest that 
the US equity risk premium has been out of line with that observed in countries 
including Germany, France, Ireland and the UK. Perhaps more importantly, we 
suggest that there may be good historical reasons for the estimate of the current equity 
risk premium to be consistent with the forecasts proposed by, for example, Fama and 
French (2002).  
On the one hand, it could be argued that researchers should rely on more 
recent estimates given that times change and history is unlikely to repeat itself. 
Furthermore, the current economic climate is relatively more stable than has been the 
case for possibly most of the 20th century. There are, however, good reasons to 
believe that aspects of the financial environment, including the degree of integration, 
stability and capital mobility today, is comparable to that seen prior to the First World 
War. Our research extends the analysis of historical estimates of the equity risk 
premium back to 1871, thereby enabling us to determine whether this pre-1914 period 
has implications for the current estimates of the equity premium.  
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Table 1 Arithmetic Equity Premia for 16 Countries (to end 2002) 
Country Start date Short Rates Long Rates 
  Equity 
Premium 
Std. Dev. Equity 
Premium 
Std. Dev. 
Australia 1882 6.99 15.8 6.57 15.9 
Austria 1927 7.12 31.9 5.59 31.9 
Belgium 1927 8.35 26.8 6.85 27.1 
Canada 1901 6.22 18.1 5.17 17.9 
Denmark 1922 3.80 22.7 3.52 22.7 
France 1871 8.49 29.4 7.42 29.2 
Germany 1871 7.73 45.0 6.68 47.5 
Japan 1914 9.89 30.2 9.83 30.14 
Ireland 1871 6.67 22.4 6.13 22.0 
Italy 1900 8.68 34.5 8.40 34.2 
Netherlands 1901 6.81 23.6 5.39 23.4 
Spain 1940 8.32 25.9 8.10 25.8 
Sweden 1919 6.95 24.5 6.33 24.4 
Switzerland 1919 7.09 21.9 6.04 21.9 
United Kingdom 1871 5.03 19.7 4.77 19.0 
United States 1871 5.69 18.5 5.63 18.1 
      
Mean  6.96 24.6 6.23 24.4 
Median  7.09 24.5 6.57 24.4 
 
This Table presents equity premia for 16 countries. These are calculated using both 
bills and bonds. Std. Dev. is the corresponding standard deviation. The start dates 
represent the point at which our data begin. The mean and median are the equally 
weighted averages respectively. The data for Germany excludes 1922-23.  
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Table 2 Arithmetic Equity Premia for 9 Countries 1900-2002 
Country Short Rates Long Rates 
 Equity 
Premium 
Std. Dev. Equity 
Premium 
Std. Dev. 
Australia 6.93 16.7 6.44 16.7 
Canada 6.22 18.1 5.17 17.9 
France 9.92 33.0 8.85 32.7 
Germany 5.18 30.0 3.36 29.7 
Ireland 7.59 25.0 6.91 24.5 
Italy 8.68 34.5 8.40 34.2 
Netherlands 6.81 23.6 5.39 23.4 
United Kingdom 5.23 22.0 4.96 21.2 
United States 6.88 19.5 6.15 19.3 
     
Mean 7.04 24.7 6.23 24.4 
Median 6.88 23.6 6.57 24.4 
 
This Table presents equity premia for 9 countries with data available between 1900 
and 2002. These are calculated using both bills and bonds. Std. Dev. is the 
corresponding standard deviation. All data starts at 1900, except Canada and the 
Netherlands, which start at 1901. The mean and median are the equally weighted 
averages respectively. The data for Germany excludes 1922-23.  
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Table 3 Arithmetic Equity Premia for 9 Countries 1900-1950, 1951-2002 
Country Short Rates Long Rates 
 Equity 
Premium 
Std. Dev. Equity 
Premium 
Std. Dev. 
1900 - 1950 
Australia 7.98 9.3 7.80 9.24 
Canada 7.71 19.0 6.88 18.9 
France 11.48 38.4 10.17 38.4 
Germany 1.37 30.5 -0.01 30.4 
Ireland 6.41 14.8 5.52 14.5 
Italy 11.51 38.4 11.69 37.9 
Netherlands 3.99 24.0 3.0 23.9 
United Kingdom 2.58 13.0 2.85 11.1 
United States 6.92 21.1 6.58 20.8 
     
Mean 6.66 23.2 6.05 22.8 
Median 6.92 21.1 6.58 20.8 
     
1951 - 2002 
Australia 6.88 16.8 6.38 16.8 
Canada 6.22 18.1 5.17 17.9 
France 10.07 33.1 8.99 32.9 
Germany 5.34 30.1 3.69 29.8 
Ireland 7.67 25.1 6.98 24.6 
Italy 8.84 34.6 8.56 34.3 
Netherlands 6.81 23.6 5.39 23.4 
United Kingdom 5.23 22.1 4.95 21.3 
United States 6.81 19.6 6.07 19.4 
     
Mean 7.10 24.8 6.24 24.5 
Median 6.81 23.6 6.07 23.4 
 
This Table presents equity premia for 9 countries with data available between 1900 
and 2002. These are calculated using both bills and bonds. Std. Dev. is the 
corresponding standard deviation. All data starts at 1900, except Canada and the 
Netherlands, which start at 1901. The mean and median are the equally weighted 
averages respectively. The data for Germany excludes 1922-23.  
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Table 4 Arithmetic Equity Premia for 5 Countries 1871-1913 
Country Short Rates Long Rates 
 Equity 
Premium 
Std. Dev. Equity 
Premium 
Std. Dev. 
France 3.26 6.7 2.39 6.6 
Germany 4.29 15.5 3.81 15.3 
Ireland 2.54 7.1 2.63 7.0 
United Kingdom 3.89 5.8 3.87 5.5 
United States 2.18 15.4 3.99 14.8 
     
Mean 3.23 10.1 3.34 9.8 
Median 3.26 7.1 3.81 7.0 
 
This Table presents equity premia for 5 countries with data available between 1871 
and 1913. These are calculated using both bills and bonds. Std. Dev. is the 
corresponding standard deviation. The mean and median are the equally weighted 
averages respectively.  
 
